



PLAUSIBILITY



PROBABILITY


“WICKED” BEHAVIORAL DESIGN

RUTH SCHMIDT, INSTITUTE OF DESIGN
14 NOV 2019

QUALITIES OF “WICKED” PROBLEMS (RITTEL & WEBBER, 1973)

- **MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS AND PERSPECTIVES**
- **INTERCONNECTEDNESS**
- **AMBIGUITY**
- **UNIQUENESS**
- **SHIFTING CONTEXT**

Effective consent in %



Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. G. (2003). Do defaults save lives? *Science*, 302(5649), 1338–1339

**LIMITATIONS
OF AVAILABLE
ORGANS**

**INCREASE
NUMBER OF
ORGAN DONORS**




MORE WICKED

LESS WICKED

**ROOT CAUSE
EFFECTS**

**“LAST MILE”
SOLUTIONS**



Underlying wishes and nudged choices.

Lin Y¹, Osman M¹, Harris AJL², Read D³.

Author information

Abstract

Is the inferred preference of a deceased relative to donate his or her organs stronger when the choice was made under a mandated rather than under an automatic default (i.e., nudged choice) legislative system? The answer to this is particularly important, because families can, and do, veto the choices of their deceased relatives. In three studies, we asked American and European participants from countries that have either a default opt-in or a default opt-out system to take on the role of a third party to judge the likelihood that an individual's "true wish" was to actually donate his or her organs, given that the decedent was registered to donate on the organ donation register. In each study participants were randomly assigned to one of four organ donation legislative systems (default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated choice, mandatory). Overall, **regardless of which country participants came from, they perceived the donor's underlying preference to donate as stronger under the default opt-in and mandated choice systems as compared with the default opt-out and mandatory donor systems.** We discuss the practical issues that result from using default systems in the domain of organ donation and propose potential ways to ameliorate the uncertainty around inferences of underlying preference from a nudged choice. (PsycINFO Database Record.

PMID: 30113195 DOI: [10.1037/xap0000183](https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000183)

**LIMITATIONS
OF AVAILABLE
ORGANS**

**INCREASE
NUMBER OF
ORGAN DONORS**

**FAMILIES CAN
OVERRIDE
CONSENT**

**MISPERCEPTIONS
OF DONATION
PROCESS**

**HOT V. COLD
STATE DECISION-
MAKING**

**“LOSS” MEANS
DIFFERENT
THINGS**

**RELATIONSHIP-
BUILDING V.
LOGISTICS**

**LIMITATIONS
OF AVAILABLE
ORGANS**

**INCREASE
NUMBER OF
ORGAN DONORS**

**FAMILIES CAN
OVERRIDE
CONSENT**

**NEED TO WORK
WITHIN TIME
CONSTRAINTS**

**DONOR
COORDINATORS
INCREASE RATES**

**“VALUE
EXCHANGE” +
TRADEOFFS VARY**

**PATIENT DEATH
= FAILURE TO
PHYSICIANS**

**INCONSISTENT
APPLICATION OF
PROTOCOLS**

**DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF
EXPERTISE**

**TRANSPLANTS
MATTER, NOT
JUST ORGANS**

**LIMITED PRIOR
EXPERIENCE
WITH DONATION**

**PEOPLE
INCENTIVIZED FOR
DIFFERENT THINGS**

IT'S A COGNITIVE (THEREFORE BEHAVIORAL) PROBLEM

FOR FAMILIES

- More likely to hear messages that patient is **improving** rather than declining
- Concept of donation can **reinforce existing pre-conceptions**


FOR THE TREATMENT TEAM

- Familiar with longer patient arc/diversity of outcomes—donation scenario is not top of mind
- Donation process is **mysterious** for doctors

FOR OPOs

- Only called in when there is possibility of donation, so **never see non-donation situations**
- **Urgency** exaggerates need for quick pattern recognition

IT'S ALSO A HUMAN SYSTEM PROBLEM...



- Families can be unwilling to accept diagnosis
- Poor understanding of complex medical situation = lack of trust, anger

- Mistaken beliefs that going to the hospital leads to “harvesting” organs
- Ineffective communication results in confusion and anger about motives

- Misunderstandings about what “brain death” means
- Tension between providing patient treatment and getting viable organs
- Poor communication and assumptions about family leads to mixed messages


*OPO = Organ Procurement Organization

I. DESIGN FOR CONDITIONS, NOT BEHAVIORS

SYSTEMS
TOP-DOWN

SENSE OF SELF
MOTIVATIONS
DEFINITIONS
WHAT PEOPLE VALUE
MISCONCEPTIONS

(LATENT) USER NEEDS
BOTTOM-UP



PROCESSES/STRUCTURES
POWER DYNAMICS
LEVERAGE POINTS
**UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES**


II. DIVERGE BEFORE CONVERGING



- **GENERATIVE RESEARCH TO REFRAME PROBLEMS
(ARE WE SOLVING THE RIGHT ONE?)**
- **FOCUS ON THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF ANALYSIS**
- **ORTHODOXIES: “HOW THINGS WORK AROUND HERE”**
- **ANALOGUES/PRECURSORS: ADJACENT SPACE
SOLUTIONS**

BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS TYPICALLY
FOCUS ON **CHOICE ARCHITECTURE** AT THE
MOMENT OF ENGAGEMENT TO ACHIEVE
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE, OFTEN BY MAKING
ACTIONS **TOO EASY NOT TO DO**

INTERVENTION V. EXPERIENCE



“COMPELLING EXPERIENCES” MODEL (5Es)

ENTICE

ENTER

ENGAGEMENT

EXIT

EXTENSION

PEOPLE OFTEN
FOCUS ON
SOLVING HERE

III. DESIGN FOR AGENCY, ARC, AND AMBIGUITY

ENTICE

ENTER

ENGAGEMENT

EXIT

EXTENSION

ATTITUDE

AWARENESS
AND RECEPTIVITY
TO A SITUATION

ABILITY

LITERAL AND/OR
PERCEIVED CAPACITY
TO MAKE CHOICES

ACTION

THE MOMENT OF
DECISION-MAKING

ACHIEVEMENT

SENSE OF
RESOLUTION OR
CONFIRMATION

ADVANCEMENT

MOMENTUM OR
PROGRESS TOWARD
LARGER GOALS

- **FAMILIARITY V. SIGNIFICANCE**
- **PEOPLE HATE FEELING DUMB**

- **CONFIDENCE, COMPETENCE AND AGENCY**
- **PROVIDING FIRST STEPS**


- **ADDING/REMOVING FRICTION**
- **URGENCY**

- **COMPLETION OR CLOSURE**
- **HOW IS "SUCCESS" DEFINED?**

- **FEEDBACK**
- **REFERENCE POINTS FOR PROGRESS**

FOR EXAMPLE

PRIOR EXPOSURE INFORMS ATTITUDES



WE KNOW LOSS HURTS MORE THAN GAIN FEELS GOOD...

FOR FAMILIES

- Loss of a loved one or family member
- Loss of a sense of control over what's happening


FOR THE TREATMENT TEAM

- Loss of a patient's life
- Loss of resources that might have gone to help another patient

FOR OPOs


- Loss of donation opportunity
- Loss of time to keep organs viable leads to urgency

IV. EXPLORE “UNIVERSAL” BEHAVIORAL FACTORS



**IDENTITY
VALUE
STORY**

KINSHIP
PERSONAL ECONOMICS
WHAT JUST "MAKES SENSE"




**IDENTITY
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WHAT JUST "MAKES SENSE"

**SIMPLICITY
STRUCTURE
SALIENCE**

COGNITIVE LOAD/SCARCITY
PRIORITIZATION
MENTAL MODELS




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**SIMPLICITY
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COGNITIVE LOAD/SCARCITY
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MENTAL MODELS



**REFERENCE POINTS
CONCREteness
TRADEOFFS**


RELATIVE LOSSES AND GAINS
WHAT'S "NORMAL"?
THE FUTURE IS ABSTRACT

IDENTITY
VALUE
STORY

KINSHIP
PERSONAL ECONOMICS
WHAT JUST "MAKES SENSE"

BARRIERS/FRICTION
OWNERSHIP
INCENTIVES

TOO EASY NOT TO DO
SENSE OF INVESTMENT
URGENCY
CONTROL



SIMPLICITY
STRUCTURE
SALIENCE

COGNITIVE LOAD/SCARCITY
PRIORITIZATION
MENTAL MODELS


REFERENCE POINTS
CONCRETENESS
TRADEOFFS

RELATIVE LOSSES AND GAINS
WHAT'S "NORMAL"?
THE FUTURE IS ABSTRACT

SOLUTIONS MAY BE VARIED

- **Rules and shared clarity about who leads when increases confidence and consistency across interactions**

- **Awareness of “hot” and “cold” states helps improve communication**
- **Externalizing group norms can increase awareness of behavioral drivers**



- **Set groundwork through framing, source and delivery mechanisms of messages in advance**
- **Debriefs for all scenarios to capture lessons when they are fresh and reduce stigma**
- **A process checklist creates shared reference**
- **Increased understanding of incentives/metrics across stakeholders**

V. CONSIDER ALL LEVERS (EVEN ONES YOU DON'T CONTROL)

PERSONAL APPEALS

(E.G. FRAMING,
DIRECT APPEAL
TO IDENTITY)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

(E.G. PHYSICAL SPACE,
SOCIAL OR CULTURAL
REINFORCEMENT)

TOOLS OF THE TRADE

(E.G. DEVICES,
MATERIALS,
MECHANISMS,
PROCESSES AND
STRUCTURES)

RULES AND METRICS

(E.G. FORMAL
POLICIES,
PENALTIES, AND
INCENTIVES)

ME

WE

TOOLS

RULES

PERSONAL APPEALS

(E.G. FRAMING, DIRECT APPEAL TO IDENTITY)




ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

(E.G. PHYSICAL SPACE, SOCIAL, OR CULTURAL REINFORCEMENT)



TOOLS OF THE TRADE

(E.G. DEVICES, MATERIALS, MECHANISMS, PROCESSES AND STRUCTURES)



RULES AND METRICS

(E.G. FORMAL POLICIES, PENALTIES, AND INCENTIVES)



Code of Conduct

This Code of Conduct helps us build a community that is rooted in kindness, collaboration, and mutual respect.

Whether you've come to ask questions or to generously share what you know, join us in building a community where all people feel welcome and can participate, regardless of expertise or identity.

We commit to enforcing and improving the Code of Conduct. It applies to everyone using Stack Overflow and the Stack Exchange network, including our team, [moderators](#), and anyone posting to Q&A sites or chat rooms.

“...EVEN WHEN USED, SUCH RIGOROUS METHODS DO NOT PRODUCE CERTAIN AND TRANSFERABLE KNOWLEDGE, BUT RATHER PROVIDE **PROVISIONAL AND ISOLATED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ‘WHAT *WORKED*’**”

Biesta, Gert. (2007), 'Why 'what works' won't work: Evidence-based practice and the democratic deficit in educational research', *Educational Theory*, 57(1): 1-22.

ABSTRACT

**DESIGN
PRINCIPLES**

**SPECULATIVE
APPROACHES**

THINK

MAKE


**CONTEXTUALIZED
RESEARCH**

**HYPOTHESIS
TESTING**


CONCRETE

VI. GENERATE SPECULATIVE HYPOTHESES


ECONOMICS




BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE



DESIGN





- **DESIGN FOR CONDITIONS, NOT BEHAVIORS**
- **DIVERGE BEFORE CONVERGING**
- **DESIGN FOR AGENCY, ARC, AND AMBIGUITY**
- **EXPLORE “UNIVERSAL” BEHAVIORAL FACTORS**
- **CONSIDER ALL LEVERS (EVEN ONES YOU DON'T CONTROL)**
- **GENERATE SPECULATIVE HYPOTHESES**