


QUALITIES OF "WICKED" PROBLEMS (RITTEL & WEBBER, 1973)

- MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS AND PERSPECTIVES
- INTERCONNECTEDNESS
- **AMBIGUITY**
- UNIQUENESS
- SHIFTING CONTEXT

Effective consent in %



Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. G. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302(5649), 1338–1339

LIMITATIONS OF AVAILABLE ORGANS

INCREASE NUMBER OF ORGAN DONORS





ROOT CAUSE EFFECTS

"LAST MILE" SOLUTIONS

Underlying wishes and nudged choices.

<u>Lin Y¹, Osman M¹, Harris AJL², Read D³.</u>

Author information

Abstract

Is the inferred preference of a deceased relative to donate his or her organs stronger when the choice was made under a mandated rather than under an automatic default (i.e., nudged choice) legislative system? The answer to this is particularly important, because families can, and do, veto the choices of their deceased relatives. In three studies, we asked American and European participants from countries that have either a default opt-in or a default opt-out system to take on the role of a third party to judge the likelihood that an individual's "true wish" was to actually donate his or her organs, given that the decedent was registered to donate on the organ donation register. In each study participants were randomly assigned to one of four organ donation legislative systems (default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated choice, mandatory). Overall, regardless of which country participants came from, they perceived the donor's underlying preference to donate as stronger under the default opt-in and mandated choice systems as compared with the default opt-out and mandatory donor systems. We discuss the practical issues that result from using default systems in the domain of organ donation and propose potential ways to ameliorate the uncertainty around inferences of underlying preference from a nudged choice. (PsycINFO Database Record.

PMID: 30113195 DOI: 10.1037/xap0000183

LIMITATIONS OF AVAILABLE ORGANS

INCREASE NUMBER OF ORGAN DONORS

FAMILIES CAN OVERRIDE CONSENT

MISPERCEPTIONS OF DONATION PROCESS

HOT V. COLD State decision-Making

"LOSS" MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS

LIMITATIONS OF AVAILABLE ORGANS

INCREASE NUMBER OF ORGAN DONORS

FAMILIES CAN OVERRIDE CONSENT

RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING V. LOGISTICS

NEED TO WORK WITHIN TIME CONSTRAINTS

DONOR COORDINATORS INCREASE RATES **"VALUE EXCHANGE" + TRADEOFFS VARY** PATIENT DEATH = FAILURE TO PHYSICIANS INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF PROTOCOLS

DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EXPERTISE TRANSPLANTS MATTER, NOT JUST ORGANS

LIMITED PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH DONATION PEOPLE INCENTIVIZED FOR DIFFERENT THINGS

IT'S A COGNITIVE (THEREFORE BEHAVIORAL) PROBLEM

FOR FAMILIES

- More likely to hear messages that patient is improving rather than declining
- Concept of donation can reinforce existing pre-conceptions

FOR THE TREATMENT TEAM

- Familiar with longer patient arc/diversity of outcomes—donation scenario is not top of mind
- Donation process is mysterious for doctors

FOR OPOs

- Only called in when there is possibility of donation, so never see non-donation situations
- **Urgency** exaggerates need for quick pattern recognition

IT'S ALSO A Human system Problem...


• Families can be unwilling

to accept diagnosis

• Poor understanding of

= lack of trust, anger

complex medical situation



- Mistaken beliefs that going to the hospital leads to "harvesting" organs
- Ineffective communication results in confusion and anger about motives

- Misunderstandings about what "brain death" means
- Tension between providing patient treatment and getting viable organs
- Poor communication and assumptions about family leads to mixed messages

*OPO = Organ Procurement Organization


I. DESIGN FOR CONDITIONS, NOT BEHAVIORS

SYSTEMS TOP-DOWN

PROCESSES/STRUCTURES POWER DYNAMICS LEVERAGE POINTS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

SENSE OF SELF MOTIVATIONS DEFINITIONS WHAT PEOPLE VALUE MISCONCEPTIONS

(LATENT) USER NEEDS BOTTOM-UP



II. DIVERGE BEFORE CONVERGING

TIVERGE


• GENERATIVE RESEARCH TO REFRAME PROBLEMS (ARE WE SOLVING THE RIGHT ONE?)

• FOCUS ON THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

• ORTHODOXIES: "HOW THINGS WORK AROUND HERE"

NVERG

 ANALOGUES/PRECURSORS: ADJACENT SPACE SOLUTIONS BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS TYPICALLY FOCUS ON CHOICE ARCHITECTURE AT THE MOMENT OF ENGAGEMENT TO ACHIEVE BEHAVIORAL CHANGE, OFTEN BY MAKING ACTIONS TOO EASY NOT TO DO




"COMPELLING EXPERIENCES" MODEL (5Es)



III. DESIGN FOR AGENCY, ARC, AND AMBIGUITY

ATTITUDE AWARENESS AND RECEPTIVITY TO A SITUATION	ABILITY LITERAL AND/OR PERCEIVED CAPACITY TO MAKE CHOICES	ACTION THE MOMENT OF DECISION-MAKING	ACHIEVEMENT SENSE OF RESOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION	ADVANCEMENT Momentum or Progress toward Larger goals
 FAMILIARITY V. SIGNIFICANCE PEOPLE HATE FEELING DUMB 	 CONFIDENCE, COMPETENCE AND AGENCY PROVIDING FIRST STEPS 	 ADDING/REMOVING FRICTION URGENCY 	 COMPLETION OR CLOSURE HOW IS "SUCCESS" DEFINED? 	 FEEDBACK REFERENCE POINTS FOR PROGRESS



WE KNOW LOSS HURTS MORE THAN GAIN FEELS GOOD...

FOR FAMILIES

Loss of a loved one or family member Loss of a sense of control over what's happening


FOR THE TREATMENT TEAM


Loss of a patient's life
Loss of resources that might have gone to help another patient


FOR OPOs


• Loss of donation opportunity


 Loss of time to keep organs viable leads to urgency












CONTROL

SOLUTIONS MAY BE VARIED

• Rules and shared clarity about who leads when increases confidence and consistency across interactions Set groundwork through framing, source and delivery mechanisms of messages in advance

- Awareness of "hot" and "cold" states helps improve communication
- Externalizing group norms can increase awareness of behavioral drivers



- **Debriefs** for all scenarios to capture lessons when they are fresh and reduce stigma
- A process checklist creates shared reference
- Increased understanding of incentives/metrics across stakeholders

V. CONSIDER ALL LEVERS (EVEN ONES YOU DON'T CONTROL)

PERSONAL APPEALS

(E.G. FRAMING, DIRECT APPEAL TO IDENTITY)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT


(E.G. PHYSICAL SPACE, SOCIAL OR CULTURAL REINFORCEMENT)

TOOLS OF THE TRADE

(E.G. DEVICES, MATERIALS, MECHANISMS, PROCESSES AND STRUCTURES)

RULES AND METRICS

(E.G. FORMAL POLICIES, PENALTIES, AND INCENTIVES)



PERSONAL APPEALS (E.G. FRAMING, DIRECT APPEAL TO IDENTITY)




ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT (E.G. PHYSICAL SPACE, SOCIAL, OR CULTURAL REINFORCEMENT)



TOOLS OF THE TRADE (E.G. DEVICES, MATERIALS, MECHANISMS, PROCESSES AND STRUCTURES)



RULES AND METRICS (E.G. FORMAL POLICIES, PENALTIES, AND INCENTIVES)



Code of Conduct


This Code of Conduct helps us build a community that is rooted in kindness, collaboration, and mutual respect.

Whether you've come to ask questions or to generously share what you know, join us in building a community where all people feel welcome and can participate, regardless of expertise or identity.

We commit to enforcing and improving the Code of Conduct. It applies to everyone using Stack Overflow and the Stack Exchange network, including our team, moderators, and anyone posting to Q&A sites or chat rooms.

"...EVEN WHEN USED, SUCH RIGOROUS METHODS DO NOT PRODUCE CERTAIN AND TRANSFERABLE KNOWLEDGE, BUT RATHER PROVIDE PROVISIONAL AND ISOLATED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 'WHAT *WORKED*"


Biesta, Gert. (2007), 'Why 'what works' won't work: Evidence-based practice and the democratic deficit in educational research', Educational Theory, 57(I): 1–22.



VI. GENERATE SPECULATIVE HYPOTHESES


ECONOMICS





BEHAVIORAL

SCIENCE



• **DESIGN FOR CONDITIONS**, NOT BEHAVIORS DIVERGE BEFORE CONVERGING DESIGN FOR AGENCY, ARC, AND AMBIGUITY • EXPLORE "UNIVERSAL" BEHAVIORAL FACTORS • CONSIDER ALL LEVERS (EVEN ONES YOU DON'T CONTROL) • GENERATE SPECULATIVE HYPOTHESES